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14. ABSTRACT Following September 11, 2001 sweeping changes were made to U.S. national strategy and institutions to deal with the threat of terrorism at home and abroad. These changes require an unprecedented level of cooperation among agencies and departments at all levels if national strategy is going to be successful. One means of unifying the efforts of all instruments of national power is to establish a unifying set of principles that all key players can use and identify with in the fight against terrorism, similar to the Principles of War that DOD uses to fight and win military battles and campaigns. The proposed principles are as follows: Objective, Unity of Effort, Freedom of Action, Initiative, Efficiency of Effort, Simplicity, Protection, Restraint, Perseverance, and Flexibility. What we call this new set of principles is less important than having and using them, but senior leadership needs to reach consensus on their purpose and their name. They could be called "The Principles of War for the Global War on Terrorism" or "The Principles for Defeating Terrorism" or simply "The Principles of War."					
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Principles for Winning the Global War on Terrorism

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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February 15, 2005

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Abstract

Following September 11, 2001 sweeping changes were made to U.S. national strategy and institutions to deal with the threat of terrorism at home and abroad. These changes require an unprecedented level of cooperation among agencies and departments at all levels if national strategy is going to be successful. One means of unifying the efforts of all instruments of national power is to establish a unifying set of principles that all key players can use and identify with in the fight against terrorism, similar to the Principles of War that DOD uses to fight and win military battles and campaigns. The proposed principles are as follows: Objective, Unity of Effort, Freedom of Action, Initiative, Efficiency of Effort, Simplicity, Protection, Restraint, Perseverance, and Flexibility.

What we call this new set of principles is less important than having and using them, but senior leadership needs to reach consensus on their purpose and their name. They could be called "The Principles of War for the Global War on Terrorism" or "The Principles for Defeating Terrorism" or simply "The Principles of War."

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Once it has been determined, from the political conditions, what a war is meant to achieve and what it can achieve, it is easy to chart the course. But great strength of character, as well as great lucidity and firmness of mind, is required in order to follow through steadily, to carry out the plan, and not be thrown off course by thousands of diversions - *Clausewitz*

Introduction

Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism was elevated to the number one threat facing the United States and sweeping changes were made to our national security strategies and to our institutions to try to address the global and domestic aspects of this new war while preserving our basic freedoms as Americans. The result of these changes is a myriad of new, complementary, and overlapping strategies, and a burgeoning bureaucracy of institutions responsible for implementing them. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created to reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks within the United States and the Department of Defense (DOD) made adjustments internally to improve homeland defense. We have created a large, complex set of institutions with overlapping functional and geographical areas of responsibility for fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). DHS and DOD have key roles in domestic security and defense while the Department of State (DOS) and DOD have key roles in the global fight.

These parallel roles with different functional responsibilities are not surprising given the dual civil-military construct we accept and value in the United States. Nevertheless, the strategic changes indicate and require an unprecedented level of cooperation at all levels of government. Cooperation is especially critical at the departmental level as we proceed with implementing these new strategies to win the GWOT. One solution to improving coordination and cooperation is to have a common set of principles to guide DOD, DHS,

DOS and other agencies who have key roles in defeating or responding to terrorism, similar to the military's *Principles of War*.

There are several reasons, some strategic and some practical, for advocating a set of unifying principles. First, winning the GWOT is a complex undertaking with multiple international and domestic fronts which will require all our instruments of national power to win, not just the military.ⁱ Second, the GWOT is an ideological war which, if history is any indicator, will take a long time to win. Keeping a sustained focus on the objectives is paramount and a set of principles can serve as the guiding framework as strategies and plans are implemented. Third and finally, the GWOT will not be our only national security priority, so our effort must be coordinated at all levels – international, national, regional, and local to remain focused on the desired end state.ⁱⁱ But before trying to define a set of unifying principles, a review of the significant changes to national strategy and institutions since September 2001 is important to understand what our new objectives are and the means with which we have to accomplish them. Only then, can we determine what the guiding principles should be.

Strategic Changes and the GWOT

Many entities have expended a monumental amount of effort since September 2001 to update and revise national strategy and military doctrine for the security and defense of the United States. Table One shows the plethora of strategic documents written, revised or proposed for national security, homeland defense, and homeland security since September 2001:

National Security Strategy (revised September 2002)	
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (new in February 2003)	
HSPD-13 & NSPD-41 Maritime Homeland Security/Defense (1/05) proposes a: National Strategy for Maritime Security (due 7/05) National Strategy for Maritime Domain Awareness (due 7/05)	
National Defense Strategy (2004)	National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002)
National Military Strategy (revised 2004)	USCG Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security (December 2002)
U.S. Northern Command's Strategic Vision (September 2003)	
Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security – JP 3-26 (March 2004 Draft)	
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (September 2004 Draft)	

Table One: Sample of New and Updated Strategies in the GWOT (Shaded blocks indicate new strategy or doctrine since September 2001)

The quantity and complexity of these strategies is unprecedented in our history, but it is the fundamental change or shift in focus that is most significant and will drive our actions as a nation for decades to come. The most significant change in strategy from the December 2000 version of the *National Security Strategy* to the September 2002 version is the overwhelming emphasis on terrorism. So much so, a new and supporting *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* was published in February 2003 which delineates U.S. objectives for winning the GWOT: 1) **defeat** terrorist organizations of global reach; 2) **deny** sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; 3) **diminish** the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and, 4) **defend** the United States, our citizens, and our interests at home and abroad.ⁱⁱⁱ This new strategy complements the *National Security Strategy* and it applies to all departments and agencies that have a role in the GWOT, not just the military.

A second major change in our “family of strategies” is that both the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* explicitly expanded the “set” of

national instruments of power for fighting and winning the GWOT from the traditional four to seven: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) to DIME and Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement.^{iv} The expansion of this “set” is a significant change from the 2000 version of the *National Security Strategy* as national leaders realized winning this type of war requires additional sources of power to defeat terrorist networks with global reach. The strategy gives domestic law enforcement, other non-DOD agencies, and the private sector a direct role within their authority and jurisdictions for deterring and combating terrorism.

Finally, two new strategies attempt to delineate the functional differences between homeland security and homeland defense for the first time in history. The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* defines homeland security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks **within** the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” while the *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* defines homeland defense as “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, and domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against **external** threats and aggression.”^{v, vi} Thus, DHS is the lead for homeland security and DOD is the lead for homeland defense, but determining whether a threat is external or internal is not necessarily an easy task in any domain as the events of September 2001 proved.^{vii}

Institutional Changes and the GWOT

Not surprisingly, and as one might predict, the institutional changes since September 2001 are as significant as the strategic ones. President Bush in conjunction with Congress acted quickly to create the Office of Homeland Security, followed by the creation of the

Homeland Security Council in October 2001 – a mirror image of the National Security Council. Then in March 2003, national leadership formed the Department of Homeland Security from twenty two different agencies with the goal to make America more secure from terrorist attacks.^{viii} Concurrently, the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs, reorganized the Combatant Commanders’ geographical areas of responsibility under DOD’s Unified Command Plan to create Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in October 2002 whose task is defined as a “seamless homeland defense” on land, at sea, and in the air.^{ix} The result is a blossoming bureaucracy with a parallel structure that attempts to preserve the separation of military and civilian authorities our democratic system demands with the “lion’s share” of responsibility for winning the GWOT:

President		
Homeland Security Council	National Security Council	
Department of Homeland Security	Department of Defense	Department of State
Directorates and Agencies	Military Services & Combatant Commanders	Ambassadors & Embassies
Homeland Security-----Homeland Defense & Global Projection		

Table Two: Homeland Security & Homeland Defense Institutional Structure

Institutional Cooperation

While it is premature to judge how well DHS and DOD are cooperating towards implementing and attaining national strategic goals, it is not premature to insist that methods be developed to prevent competition and dysfunction inherent in hierarchical institutional structures. To that end, NORTHCOM has established a “joint interagency coordination group with representatives from 46 defense and non-defense agencies” to ensure cooperation at the operational level for homeland defense.^x But cooperation at the national strategic level is imperative as well. Operation Iraqi Freedom has important lessons in this regard. As one

author notes, “the failure to understand the scale of the problems in conflict termination and nation-building was compounded by major organizational problems within the U.S. government. These problems included deep divisions between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, and other agencies.”^{xi} The U.S. has to overcome these divisions if we are going to win the GWOT.

While a set of principles may not be the only solution to mending institutional rifts and divisions, it is a logical first step in the process. Another “unifying” strategy or a “strategy of strategies” seems absurd and likely to gather dust on a shelf rather than be a practical solution. Moreover, a proposed Goldwater-Nichols-like oversight body for interagency efforts advocated by General Pace, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while practical, may be premature while DHS and DOD continue sorting out their relationships with each other as well as with fifty states and thousands of local “first responder” agencies.^{xii} Eventually, such an oversight body may be needed to coordinate and prioritize resources and efforts just as the Joint Chiefs do now for DOD services. In the meantime, the U.S. can benefit by modifying and adopting existing principles to provide a common framework for individuals, agencies, and departments to use at the strategic (national), operational (regional/state), and tactical (local) levels in the GWOT.

Existing Principles

The *Principles of War*, the *Principles of Military Operations Other Than War* (*Principles of MOOTW*), as well as other versions of current or proposed *Operating Principles* and the *Fundamentals of Warfare*, were used as the basis for defining this new set of principles for defeating terrorism (see Appendix A for a comparison chart of existing and proposed principles).^{xiii, xiv, xv, xvi} The military uses the *Principles of War* “to compel an

enemy to do its will” or the *Principles of MOOTW* “for purposes other than large-scale combat operations usually associated with war” as guides for planning and executing service and joint operations at all levels.^{xvii, xviii} But neither set, individually or collectively, addresses the unique threats, challenges, and situations the U.S. will face in a global, ideological war with many fronts, nor do they address the strategic and institutional changes the U.S. made after 9/11 to combat terrorism.

Proposed “Principles for the GWOT”

Thus, the proposed *Principles for the GWOT* were defined to address the changes made to national and departmental strategic objectives as well as the diverse challenges the GWOT presents at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They attempt to capture the primary and supporting functions that need to be accomplished by DOD, DHS, DOS, and other federal, state and local agency personnel to implement plans and carryout operations in a unified way. Each principle was defined using clear, concise terminology that is broad enough to be inclusive yet specific enough to guide thoughts and actions at all levels. If they are used as intended, these principles can help ensure we “follow through steadily to carry out the plan” for defeating terrorism.^{xix}

1. Objective: Direct every operation toward a clearly defined and attainable objective.

This principle is the Coast Guard’s *Operating Principle* of **clear objective** and it is very similar to other existing and proposed definitions. This definition is broader and more inclusive than the more narrowly defined *Principle of War*, **objective**. It can be applied to the full spectrum of GWOT activities (e.g., WMD response, preemptive strike, or law enforcement operation) and guide the diverse personnel charged with accomplishing the

tasks and functions required to meet the objective (e.g., FBI agents, first responders, and military services).

2. Unity of Effort: Seek unity of effort in every operation.

This principle is the current *Principle of MOOTW*. Using this definition acknowledges success in the GWOT will depend on military, interagency, and interdepartmental cooperation and coordination, especially among DOD, DOJ, DOS, DHS, and state and local agencies. When the *Principle of War* **Unity of Command** can be obtained, it should be used; otherwise, **Unity of Effort** is the guiding principle.^{xx} It is interesting and important to note that many of the strategies mentioned earlier and some of the findings in *The 9/11 Commission Report* use the term **Unity of Effort** explicitly to advocate the importance of this principle.^{xxi}

3. Freedom of Action: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through flexible application of power.

This principle is adapted from the current *Fundamental of Warfare* **freedom of action** and the current *Principle of War* **maneuver**. “Power” includes military might as well as those listed in the most current *National Security Strategy*: diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information and intelligence.^{xxii} In order to win the GWOT and other wars and conflicts, the U.S. and its allies have to ensure **freedom of action** in all domains at home and abroad: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Winning the GWOT will require coordinated and synchronized application of power by multiple entities, military and civilian.

4. Initiative: Use defensive and offensive actions to seize and maintain the advantage.

This principle is a current *Fundamental of Warfare* and connotes the defensive aspects of the GWOT as well as the offensive. **Initiative**, as defined here, can include the use of **surprise** and **deception** since these methods directly support seizing the advantage.

This principle is defined broadly enough to capture the full range of actions needed in the GWOT: NORTHCOM and the Coast Guard can use it as a guide in providing an “active, layered, defense of the U.S.; special operations forces can use it as a guide to carry out “an aggressive, offensive strategy to eliminate capabilities which allow terrorists to exist and operate;” and, DHS and other federal, state, and local agencies can use it as a guide as they work to keep the U.S. secure from internal threats of terrorism.^{xxiii}

5. Efficiency of Effort: Allocate and synchronize resources and power to achieve decisive effects at the most advantageous place and time.

This principle combines two current *Principles of War*: **mass** and **economy of force**. **Efficiency** replaces **economy** because **economy** implies withholding available force or power; whereas, **efficiency** means the “effective or useful output to the total input in any system.”^{xxiv} It is the measured and deliberate use of resources to accomplish prioritized goals to ensure decisive outcomes. It implies that secondary and tertiary goals will have fewer resources in order to ensure success of the primary goal at a decisive point and time. **Effort** replaces **mass** because of the potential for misunderstanding by non-military forces and because it has to apply to more than combat power as the current *Principle of War* connotes.^{xxv} Furthermore, it implies that services, departments, and agencies will coordinate and synchronize their resources to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure there is an available **reserve** of resources for contingency operations.^{xxvi} **Efficiency of Effort** is especially important because our resources as a nation are limited, and inefficient use of resources facilitates terrorist strategy by weakening our financial and moral wherewithal to fight the GWOT.

6. Simplicity: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans, and orders to ensure thorough understanding.

This principle is the current *Principle of War*. It is imperative to keep plans simple especially across the full spectrum of operations that could occur in the GWOT. Adhering to this principle is particularly challenging and seems contradictory given the complex strategic overlay and the hierarchical and insular nature of our institutions; nevertheless, successful joint military, multinational, interdepartmental, and interagency operations depend on simple plans. The military's Joint Operations Planning and Execution System and the civilian sector's Incident Command System help to facilitate this principle at all operational levels for deliberate, contingency, and crisis action planning.

7. Protection: Secure forces, sensitive information, key locations, friendly populations, and critical infrastructure from enemy harm.

This principle is a major rewrite of the current *Principle of War security* and incorporates additional elements that need to be protected if we are going to succeed in implementing new GWOT strategies and plans to defeat the enemy. Protecting these elements is critical to preventing future attacks and ensuring **freedom of action** and **continuity of operations** at all levels if an enemy attack occurs.

8. Restraint: Apply military power, law enforcement capability or legal authority appropriately.

This principle is adapted from the current *Principle of MOOTW*. For military forces, this principle means applying and complying with standing or modified Rules of Engagement. For law enforcement, DHS, and other agency personnel this principle means exercising Constitutional and regulatory authority within existing jurisdictional and legal boundaries. **Restraint** does not imply "be conservative" in action or in the use of force; it implies working within the international and domestic legal frameworks to achieve and

preserve national interests. If **restraint** is used as intended by this definition at the operational and tactical levels, it facilitates **legitimacy** of the national objective or strategy, while enabling forces to meet a full spectrum of activities the GWOT requires.

9. Perseverance: Prepare for a measured, protracted, and sustainable effort in support of strategic and operational objectives and plans.

This principle is adapted from the current *Principle of MOOTW*. It is not just a force **readiness** issue but is meant to be all encompassing; this definition includes the **spiritual** (moral), **intellectual**, and **materiel** condition of forces and personnel at all levels within the military and government.^{xxvii} If national leaders are correct, the GWOT is going to take a long time to win, and the physical and mental “staying power” of leadership and the forces engaged in the GWOT will need to focus on long-term objectives as well as day-to-day operations.

10. Flexibility: Adapt operations to meet multiple objectives or missions simultaneously.

This principle is adapted from the current Coast Guard *Operating Principle* and it is similar to the proposed *Fundamental of 21st Century Warfare* **adaptability**.^{xxviii} It recognizes military, and civilian agency and department personnel have other responsibilities besides defending or securing the U.S. against terrorism (e.g., MOOTW, search and rescue, lawful immigration, etc.), and they will have to adapt easily between roles in order to meet all mandated missions. It also acknowledges different entities may be the supported, supporting commander, or lead federal agency, depending on the situation, objective, or location of an operation. All personnel need to understand their roles across a broad range of scenarios and be able to adapt to changing circumstances, plans, and orders.

The Principles of “What”?

Clearly, much more could be written to refine these principles, but first senior military and civilian leadership have to agree that some type of unifying framework or set of principles is needed. In addition to reaching consensus on the necessity of a set of common principles, there needs to be consensus on what to call them. Giving the principles an appropriate name is as important as defining and promulgating them and can have lasting implications. If we look to the strategic guidance at the national level for the GWOT, there are several possible titles which would describe the overall purpose of these proposed principles: *The Principles of War for the Global War on Terrorism* or *The Principles for Defeating Terrorism* or, simply, *The Principles of War*.

Each title has unique, if not subtle, consequences. If we use the first alternative, *The Principles of War for the Global War on Terrorism*, then military personnel would have three sets of principles to follow, and we would possibly be setting a precedent by defining a set of principles for a specific war. If we use the second alternative, *The Principles for Defeating Terrorism*, then we intentionally leave the word “war” out which weakens the intention and resolve inherent in the scheme of national strategies to fight and win the GWOT. And finally, if we accept the GWOT is in fact, war, then these principles could be the “new” or revised *Principles of War*, but both the *Principles of War* and the *Principles of MOOTW* have traditionally applied only to the military. In fact, early application of the *Principles of War* restricted their use to those objectives which governed the actual “employment of armed forces” and not to the support functions involved in the organizing, training, and administering of forces.^{xxix} Continual reexamination of their purpose and value over time expanded this narrow application to the broader interpretation used today. And, in 1993 the

Principles of MOOTW were added because the *Principles of War* could no longer guide all the missions the military was being asked to perform in the interest of national security strategy.^{xxx} Is it time then, given the significant strategic changes, to reevaluate not only the meaning of the current *Principles of War* as they relate to the GWOT but also their applicability to other entities?

In order to answer this question and the question of what to call the proposed *Principles for the GWOT* there are several points to consider: First, do these proposed *Principles for the GWOT* capture the essence of 21st Century Warfare? Second, can the military use them for wars and conflicts other than the GWOT? Third, is it acceptable for *The Principles of War* to apply to non-military instruments of power? It is not that they cannot apply; it is a question of whether we want them to apply. If consensus can be reached on these three questions, then we should call the proposed *Principles of the GWOT* the *Principles of War* and avoid having a third set of principles, especially if we want a simple, yet complete, guiding framework for our GWOT efforts. If consensus cannot be reached on these issues, then we should call these principles *The Principles for Winning the Global War on Terrorism* because this title captures, most succinctly, precisely, and positively, the essence of national strategic intent.

Conclusion

The amount of effort expended since September 2001 in adjusting our national security strategies and institutions is truly remarkable, yet the changes we have made may not be enough to defeat terrorism if we do not heed the lessons history has taught us – parallel structures with the same purpose but different means must have a common foundation. Some have even suggested that terrorist groups will try to take advantage of our

complex national security system by looking for new “seams” of vulnerability just as they did in 2001.^{xxxix} Therefore, the parallel structure between DOD and DHS, at home, and between DOD and DOS, abroad, are two seams we have to succeed in unifying if we hope to prevent another attack on American soil and to protect American interests overseas.

The military services have learned this lesson already, largely because of poorly coordinated and executed operations between services or between different components of the same service, which cost American lives. The solution to these failures was to develop joint methods of planning and conducting operations with the *Principles of War* as the foundation. This doctrine has taken decades to develop and implement and has vastly improved military operations while preserving the identity and strengths of each service. If we have learned anything from the tragic events of September 11, 2001, it is that we do not have decades to relearn this lesson. It is imperative we move forward quickly to unify our efforts between new and existing departments and agencies tasked with a GWOT role. One could even argue that the “need for ‘jointness’ does not apply simply to the U.S. military; it must apply to the entire U.S. government.”^{xxxix}

We do not need to compromise the separation of our military and civilian institutions to do this, nor do we need to apply military doctrine comprehensively to non-DOD departments or agencies. However, we do need a set of principles to lay the foundation for DOD, DHS, DOS and other entities to work together in their GWOT efforts. Eventually, there may be a need to formalize departmental interaction and procedures in a more comprehensive “doctrinal” manner or to have a formal oversight body; but for now, a set of principles can help prevent our new strategies and plans from being “thrown off course by a thousand diversions.”^{xxxix} Diversions we cannot afford in terms of lives lost, time

wasted, or money misspent. The principles suggested here describe the ways in which all personnel tasked with a role in the GWOT will need to think and to act in order to **diminish**, **deny**, and **defeat** terrorism on a local and a global scale no matter how long it takes.

Principles of War (JP 3-0)	Principles of MOOTW (JP 3-0)	USCG Operating Principles (CG Pub 1)	Proposed Principles for Winning the GWOT	Principles of Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Fundamentals of Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Evolving Fundamentals of 21st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
Objective Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.	Objective Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.	Clear Objective Direct every operation toward a clearly defined and attainable objective.	Objective Direct every operation toward a clearly defined and attainable objective.	Objective Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.		End State Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined and attainable objective that achieves intended strategic or operational objectives.
Unity of Command Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.	Unity of Effort Seek unity of effort in every operation.	Unity of Effort Achieve internal and external unity of effort in meeting operational objectives.*	Unity of Effort Seek unity of effort in every operation.	Unity of Effort Seek unity of effort in every operation. (Note: Unity of effort is the function required & unity of command should be the form used)	Unity of Effort Direct operations to achieve common aims.*	Unity of Effort Direct all actions toward a common purpose.

Principles of War (JP 3-0)	Principles of MOOTW (JP 3-0)	USCG Operating Principles (CG Pub 1)	Proposed Principles of War for the GWOT	Principles of Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Fundamentals of Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Evolving Fundamentals of 21 st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
Mass				Massed Effects	Concentration	Application of Combat Power
Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results.				Concentration of all pertinent capabilities, military and other to achieve mission success.*	Strive to operate with overwhelming force (quantity & quality of forces & planning).*	(Note: this encompasses “Mass,” “Economy of Force,” and “Restraint”) Concentrate the effects of combat power in multiple dimensions from dispersed locations at critical points and times, while allocating minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts that are necessary to preserve freedom of action.

Principles of War (JP 3-0)	Principles of MOOTW (JP 3-0)	USCG Operating Principles (CG Pub 1)	Proposed Principles of War for the GWOT	Principles of Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Fundamentals of Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Evolving Fundamentals of 21 st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
Maneuver			Freedom of Action	Maneuver	Freedom of Action	Joint Maneuver & Tempo
Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through flexible application of combat power.			Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through flexible application of power.	Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through flexible application of combat power.	Components: use of DIME; robust logistics support at all levels; deception.	Employment of joint force capabilities to gain and exploit positional advantage throughout the battlespace in order to generate the effects desired to facilitate achievement of strategic and operational objectives. Establish and control the timing, cycle, sequence, reach, and intensity of an operation to best exploit friendly capabilities against adversaries and situations.

Principles of War (JP 3-0)	Principles of MOOTW (JP 3-0)	USCG Operating Principles (CG Pub 1)	Proposed Principles of War for the GWOT	Principles of Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Fundamentals of Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Evolving Fundamentals of 21st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
Offensive		On-Scene Initiative	Initiative	Offensive	Initiative	Initiative
Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.		Act quickly and decisively within authority to obtain tactical and operational objectives.*	Use defensive and offensive actions to seize and maintain the advantage.	Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.	Use defensive and offensive actions to seize and maintain the advantage.*	Seize, retain, and exploit opportunities to impose friendly will by establishing the terms and conditions of the action, and by forcing the adversary (if present) to react to them.
Economy of Force			Efficiency of Effort	Economy of Force		
Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.			Allocate and synchronize resources to achieve decisive effects at the most advantageous place and time.	Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.		

Principles of War (JP 3-0)	Principles of MOOTW (JP 3-0)	USCG Operating Principles (CG Pub 1)	Proposed Principles of War for the GWOT	Principles of Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Fundamentals of Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Evolving Fundamentals of 21 st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
Simplicity			Simplicity	Simplicity	Clarity & Knowledge	Understanding
Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.			Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.	Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.	Use common terms and procedures. Knowledge of self & enemy.	Know, comprehend, and share common relevant knowledge of the global battlespace to facilitate operational execution.
Surprise				Surprise	Shock	
Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.				Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.	Strike adversaries at unexpected times and places and in manners for which they are not physically or mentally prepared, by the direction, nature, timing, boldness, and force of the attack.	

Principles of War (JP 3-0)	Principles of MOOTW (JP 3-0)	USCG Operating Principles (CG Pub 1)	Proposed Principles of War for the GWOT	Principles of Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Fundamentals of Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Evolving Fundamentals of 21st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
Security	Security		Protection	Security		Safeguarding the Force
Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.	Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.		Secure forces, sensitive information, key locations, friendly populations, and critical infrastructure from enemy harm.	Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.		Protect friendly forces from adversarial surprise or from the potential effects of other detrimental developments.
	Restraint	Restraint	Restraint			
	Apply appropriate military capability prudently.	Exercise Constitutional and regulatory authority prudently and treat American and foreign citizens with dignity and respect.*	Apply military, law enforcement capability or legal authority appropriately.			

Principles of War (JP 3-0)	Principles of MOOTW (JP 3-0)	USCG Operating Principles (CG Pub 1)	Proposed Principles of War for the GWOT	Principles of Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Fundamentals of Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Evolving Fundamentals of 21 st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
	Perseverance Prepare for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic goals.		Perseverance Prepare for a measured, protracted, and sustainable effort in support of strategic and operational objectives and plans.			Will Sustain the resolve of friendly forces in the face of adversity, while seeking to break the resolve of adversaries.
	Legitimacy Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group/agency to make and carry out decisions.					Legitimacy Foster, sustain and communicate the legal, moral, and just nature of the operation and actions of the US Government and participating partners.
		Effective Presence Keep the right assets in the right place at the right time.*				

Principles of War (JP 3-0)	Principles of MOOTW (JP 3-0)	USCG Operating Principles (CG Pub 1)	Proposed Principles of War for the GWOT	Principles of Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Fundamentals of Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Evolving Fundamentals of 21 st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
		Flexibility Adapt operations to meet multiple objectives/missions simultaneously.*	Flexibility Adapt operations to meet multiple objectives or missions simultaneously.		Agility The ability to move quickly and easily, should characterize US military ops. Agility is relative; the aim is to be more agile than the foe. Agility is not primarily concerned with speed itself, but about timeliness: thinking, planning, communicating, and acting faster than the enemy can effectively react.	Adaptability Respond mentally and physically to identify, induce, and exploit new patterns in both the larger security environment and in the specific operational area more rapidly and effectively than adversaries.
		Managed Risk Ensure force and equipment readiness and use risk-based decision making during ops.*				
Principles of	Principles of	USCG Operating	Proposed	Principles of	Fundamentals of	Evolving

War (JP 3-0)	MOOTW (JP 3-0)	Principles (CG Pub 1)	Principles of War for the GWOT	Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Fundamentals of 21 st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
				Morale Build and maintain the spiritual, intellectual and material condition of the force to fight.*		
				Exploitation Keep the momentum going and consolidate gains while keeping the enemy on the defensive.*		

Principles of War (JP 3-0)	Principles of MOOTW (JP 3-0)	USCG Operating Principles (CG Pub 1)	Proposed Principles of War for the GWOT	Principles of Operations (Glenn, 1998)	Fundamentals of Joint Warfare (JP 1)	Evolving Fundamentals of 21 st Century Warfare and Crisis Resolution
					Sustainment Strategic and theater logistics and deployment concepts are integral to combat success. These concepts are driven by the plans and orders of JFCs and supported by the services, by other supporting commands, and often by support from allies and friends.	Sustainability Provide, support, maintain, and prolong those levels of ready forces, material, and consumables necessary to maintain the required intensity and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives.
					Extension Use fullest breadth and depth of operations feasible given political, force, and logistic constraints.	

* Paraphrased because no succinct definition was given.

End Notes

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- ⁱ President, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: February 2003), 1.
- ⁱⁱ President, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: 17 September 2002), 1.
- ⁱⁱⁱ President, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 11-12.
- ^{iv} Ibid, 1.
- ^v Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 17 July 2002), 2.
- ^{vi} Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (First Coordination Draft) (Washington, DC: September 13, 2004), 10.
- ^{vii} 9/11 Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. (New York, NY: 2004), 427-428.
- ^{viii} William W. Newmann, "Reorganizing for National Security and Homeland Security," Public Administration Review 62 (September 2002): 131.
- ^{ix} Department of Defense, Northern Command Strategic Vision. (Peterson, AFB: September 11, 2003), 4.
- ^x Harold Kennedy, "U.S. Northern Command Actively Enlisting Partners" National Defense. (June 2004): 42.
- ^{xi} Anthony Cordesman, "Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerilla War?" (Washington, D.C.: 28 July 2003), 15.
- ^{xii} Jim Garamone, "Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act" American Forces Information Service. 7 September 2004, 1.
- ^{xiii} Norman M. Wade, The Joint Forces Operational Warfighting SMARTbook. (Lakeland, Florida: The Lightning Press, 2003), 1-12, 1-13, 1-18, & 1-19.
- ^{xiv} Coast Guard, Coast Guard Publication 1. (Washington, DC: January 2002), 71-84.
- ^{xv} Russell W. Glenn, "No More Principles of War?" Parameters 28 (Spring 1998): 55.
- ^{xvi} Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM. Joint Pub 1. (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2004), III-8.
- ^{xvii} Carl von Clausewitz, On War. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.
- ^{xviii} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Joint Pub 3-0, V-1.
- ^{xix} Clausewitz, 178.
- ^{xx} Wade, 1-18.
- ^{xxi} 9/11 Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report, 400, 407, 416, 419.
- ^{xxii} President, The National Security Strategy of the United States, 1.
- ^{xxiii} President, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 17.
- ^{xxiv} The American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 587.
- ^{xxv} Wade, 1-12.
- ^{xxvi} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Joint Pub 3-0. (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), Appendix A.
- ^{xxvii} Glenn, 58.

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- ^{xxviii} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council - An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century. (Washington, DC: 28 January 2003), 58.
- ^{xxix} C.R. Brown “The Principles of War.” Proceedings, 75, 6 (June 1949): 623.
- ^{xxx} Glenn, 48.
- ^{xxxi} Flynn, Stephen, America the Vulnerable. (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 141.
- ^{xxxii} Cordesman, 16.
- ^{xxxiii} Clausewitz, 178.

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